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Tax Competition in the Film Industry
Being one of the largest industries in the world, the film industry remains an
economic powerhouse in our society. It’s for this reason that film’s messages are not the
only political aspects of their creation. Senators and representatives across the country are
increasingly seeing the film industry as key towards economic development. With
incentive packages being placed around the country, the politics over the film industry
have become an overwhelming power game. Politicians are being threatened with recalls
and impeachment to keep their economies afloat during harsh economic times. Without
raising taxes, representatives have hit a wall. Increasing debt and job shortages, in our
current economy, are leading politicians to the West for economic growth. Whether film
is considered a piece of art or a commercial product, state and local governments are
looking West with Hollywood as the possible answer.
There are many general fiscal tools that are used to propel a possible increase in
state revenues. There are three primary means of creating state revenues: tax revenues,
intergovernmental revenues, and insurance trust revenues. With a greater emphasis on tax
revenues, in Mark Crain’s book Volatile States Crain states that, “Regarding tax revenues
states rely largely on three instruments: general and selective sales taxes, individual (or
personal) income taxes, and corporation net taxes” (Crain, 50). With a general mix of the
three accounting for the base of their tax revenue, state representatives have to determine
their state fiscal policies, while, all along, keeping their constituents in mind. The trend
has been towards state sales tax; many states are becoming uniform in their ideals of
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generating tax revenue by looking at state income tax as a major possibility, while
corporate net taxes, generating a small amount of tax revenue for states, have remained at
the wayside. According to Crain, “By 2010, the typical state will raise most of its tax
revenues from the individual income tax” (Crain, 63). Though many of the changes
towards personal income tax have remained regressive, there are still instances of
progressive change.
As well, states can also focus on state and local business taxation and property
taxes as possibilities to further create tax revenue. Pogue refers to a “business tax” as:
“any tax on a business’s purchase of inputs, its ownership of assets, its earnings, or its
right to do business” (Pogue, 89) Taxing businesses creates a larger tax base for
representatives to tax without generating population uproar. Taxing business has been
seen as an efficient resource allocation in terms of internalizing social costs and in
supplementing direct taxes. By taxing businesses state and local governments will be able
to hold businesses accountable for unpriced inputs of governmental services and negative
externalities, such as environmental damage. However, there still remain struggles to
carry out uniform tax policies to create the optimal outcome for corporations to create
products the most efficient and cost-effective way. While taxing companies in relation to
their social costs, being the negative externalities a company emits towards the general
populace through their business practices, different states levy taxes in order to propel
economic growth in their states, leading to tax competition. According to Pogue,
“Whether or not state and local governments implement new taxes and fees to internalize
social costs, they could broaden the bases of existing business taxes, especially
corporation income and business property taxes” (Pogue, 105). With a proposed
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uniformity between neighboring states, states will be able to propel stronger economic
growth at an optimal level.
Creating further tax revenue, property and sales tax also remain another fiscal
possibility for state and local governments. However, with the increasing use of sales-tax,
property taxes have become less desirable to constituents. The lump sum property taxes
put excessive pressure on residents to pay their taxes at stressful “all at once” intervals. It
is because property and income taxes are so bulky that government officials become
targets of unwarranted regressive taxing, leading to unhappy constituents. With income
taxes becoming a bigger player in the tax resource picture, residents are beginning to
become touchy on tax increases, resulting in tax initiatives such as Proposition 13 in
California. According to Beamer from his text Creative Politics, “If legislators can hide
or obscure tax burdens by shifting from obvious ‘lumpy’ property taxes to less hidden,
incremental sales and business taxes, they may create the perception of higher benefit/tax
ratios when in reality they have only obscured a portion of the tax denominator” (Beamer,
14). Many constituents look at the increasing income taxes in reference to what’s wrong
with the federal government, thus many voters are looking to sales taxes as their primary
means for tax revenue. However, even with this change in the fiscal market, voters still
remain hesitant to allow tax increases. Many tax-paying citizens don’t feel comfortable
with even the most marginal of tax hikes. Tax-payers then look towards tax revolt as a
possible means to influence these tax policy changes from occurring.
State and local representatives have come up against a wall. Increasing tax
revenue is no longer a popular means to provide services to their district. Most taxes,
income, property, and sales are seen by certain voters as regressive, depending on what
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side of the political hill they’re coming from. David Super examines taxes in their
cyclical relation to the economic cycle of boom and bust. “Precisely because property
taxes continue to extract similar amounts even after a recession has reduced many
owners’ ability to pay, they have taken the brunt of taxpayers’ revolts” (Super, 369). As
well as dealing with regressive taxes such as the property tax, many states are dealing
with governments that are “overspending” their budgets on public projects and towards
public funds. Many constituents want to see their money returned to them through tax
rebates and will settle for less money being allocated to “unneeded” public policies that
only given benefits to certain groups of the population. Taxes have become associated
with corrupt governments and overzealous legislatures that control purse strings. Thus,
voters are beginning to propose tax revolts, when legislatures overspend on issues that
help the commonwealth in general, but not their specific needs.
TEL’s or Tax and Expenditure Limits, which limit governmental taxes and
spending limits, have been recognized as a stronger tool for direct democracy in many
states across the nation. Voters create initiatives limiting state budgets on specific
revenues, mostly tax, to keep the legislature from spending their money. Though
theoretically a healthy idea for spending containment, most TELs have shortcomings and
loopholes. Among them, California’s “Gann Limit” legislature spending limit is probably
the most infamous. “Proposition 4, the ‘Gann limit,’ passed in 1979 as a part of the
state’s famed tax revolt and established formula limiting the growth of expenditures of
tax dollars” (Kousser et. al., 290). Led by Paul Gann, a co-sponsor of previous tax
propositions, the tax revolt was initiated by a private group, "The Spirit of 13, Inc.," who
collected over 900,000 signatures, a hugely significant amount for any tax revolt, to
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openly prohibit the Californian State Legislature from freely spending excess amounts of
community revenue. Though infamous because of the tax-payers’ massive cooperative
action to rescind their legislatures’ budget power, Kousser argues that the Gann Limit did
not constrain growth of state government, because legislators have used their powers to
circumvent limitations in the details of thousand-page budget papers. Eventually, the
Gann Limit became a dead issue because it did not limit nontax revenue and state
legislatives continued to spend money through debt and user charges and fees of state
institutions. “By turning to alternate sources of revenue, such as debt and user charges,
lawmakers are able to undermine the spirit of the tax-revolt era and spend freely”
(Kousser et. al., 308). California’s increasing debt burden caused more problems than
many foresaw.
State constituents want to continue their economic growth. With growing
populations, states are beginning to index towards inflation and population leading to
further public spending, thus reflecting the inefficiencies of Tax and Expenditure Limits.
Thus, even initiatives are reaching past constituent control, their effectiveness depending
on the political environment and the ideological patterns of their lawmakers. Even with a
budget policy under electorate control, governmental officials are still finding the means
to spend money, whether by means of the people’s resources, or by spending money that
they don’t have. Despite the recognition of TELs, their success remains directly on
whether politically environments are fiscally conservative, not needing the limits in the
first place. This leads lawmakers and constituents back to where they began, trying to
find a way to compromise on reduced spending, while giving the public all that it wants.
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So, what is a governmental official to do? Lawmakers are constantly facing the
battle of where to get the resources for the public’s needs. Legislators are dealing with the
Tax-Service Paradox, essentially meaning that constituents don’t want to get taxed higher
rates and yet want more public services. During fiscal crisis, this has led lawmakers to
look for new and innovative ways to regain resources during their economic collapse.
According to Steven Gold, “Currently a great deal of interest has been stimulated by the
book Reinventing Government, which urges that state and local governments adopt
numerous reforms such as decentralizing, privatizing, deregulating, becoming more
enterprising, and reforming budget to make it results-oriented rather than input-oriented”
(Gold, 46). Though most of these reforms aren’t new by any means, they provide states
with the harsh possibilities of dealing with recent fiscal crises including cutting spending
and short term benefits, increasing revenue by increasing their tax base, and through
gimmicks, which merely shift costs to a later period. Many state and local governments
have and are looking to reform to help stabilize and promote economic growth in their
jurisdictions. According to Gold, “In terms of spending, reforms may try to implement
some of the reinventing government themes, or they may reorient budget priorities. In
terms of taxation, reforms may aim to make the tax system more fair or favorable to
economic development or to increase the neutrality, stability, or elasticity of the tax
system” (Gold, 48). Though reforms are categorized differently, based on the political
culture of the state that can be used to promote growth, they still leave lawmakers in
constrained situations. Gold also mentions that these reforms are not exhaustive and
though many state governments try to initiate reforms without angering their electorate,
they suspend these reforms because of their policy constraints through direct democracy.
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This leads them to increase their budgets through debts and deficits, keeping their
spending constant and their short term economy stable, all the while keeping the future in
the dark.
In order to keep states from being in the dark, law makers look to new abstract
and obscure strategies to keep their economies afloat and create future growth. One
strategy that states employ to promote economic growth, as well as competition with each
other, is tax competition. “Among the most prominent features of state policy in recent
years has been the proliferation of tax provisions designed to improve the state’s business
climates and to enhance their ability to attract and retain business investment and the
associated jobs” (Enrich, 73). Most scholars argue that tax competition thwarts the
national economic success and benefits sole states. As well, tax incentive packages are a
high risk when states expect to make back their tax incentive revenue through the
business after the business has developed in their area.
Tax competition is believed to intensify in upcoming years, leading to more
interstate commerce. Tax abatements, and credits for expansion for car manufacturers
and other commodity companies are getting past the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, in
which Congress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, between states,
and with the Native American tribes. Peter Enrich argues that this is simply because no
case has been brought to the Supreme Court in order to challenge the unconstitutionality
of tax competition. Therefore, with tax incentives increasing throughout state
governments, state and local officials are facing the classic prisoner’s dilemma, a form of
game theory in which one player's success in making choices depends strictly on the
choices of others. Thus, the optimal outcome for each state, the player, in which both
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states receive the most benefited outcome possible, would be to have zero tax incentives.
But fairing constituent pressure to “do something” for economic growth, state law makers
are still wrapped up in competition for businesses, thinking that every business attracted
and located in their state will be the exception. As Enrich describes, “In this environment,
it is very hard for a political leader to oppose highly visible measures that vocal business
representatives assert will improve the states’ “business climate” and help to attract or
retain jobs” (Enrich, 77). And what industry would influence political leaders more than
the stabilized “recession-proof” American Film Industry?
“Motion pictures, meeting at popular prices, the universal demand for recreation
and amusement, have quickly become an essential part of modern living” (Halsey, Stuart
& Co., 195). The lucrative profiting behind the Film Industry is well known to policy
makers across the nation. Since the beginning of the 20th century, film moguls have been
making their impact on the rest of the nation. However, it wasn’t until the studio system
that the film industries became well-oiled machines. What’s significant about the film
industries’ success is that it occurred when the rest of the country was suffering from the
Great Depression, running dry with debt and hunger. Films provided escapist comedies
and dramas that helped many cope with the economic down turns of the country. The
studio systems’ success promoted huge economic growth for California during the Great
Depression. Since then, and with the invention of the genre system, a film production
system which promotes the familiarized and financially predictable genre films such as
romantic comedies or slasher horror films, business men and policy makers alike have
looked to the Film Industry, as a sure medium of financial growth. However, the
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difficulty in convincing the industry to invest in local and state economies has been
relatively difficult.
“The great concentration of film production within that small geographical area is
a distinctive of this industry” (Halsey, 200). Although Hollywood is a unique local dream
factory to Californians, since globalization the possibilities of transferring the film
industry to foreign markets as well as different state markets have been a central motive
to film investors. Primarily, seeing where producers can produce a film the cheapest and
where the film incentive packages are the best remains the key factor in film production.
These film productions would not only produce jobs and investment to state economies,
but it would provide a state exposition to the rest of the nation, encouraging further
growth through tourism. This financial strategy would keep constituents interest not only
because they’re not paying higher taxes but because the dreams of Hollywood are being
made in their backyard.
“The MPAA (2004) estimated that in 2001, the U.S. entertainment industry had
more than 700,000 total employees and contributed $41 billion in expenditures to the U.S.
economy” (Litvak, 281). From Litvak’s research, it’s conclusive that the states with the
highest impact in this area are California with New York trailing in a far second.
Runaway production of films to cheaper states has been occurring since the break down
of the studio system in the 1960’s. Once located solely in California, projects are being
moved not only to different states but to different countries, leading in this trend is
Canada. Many economic officials argue, as before, that the tax competition between
states for film industry production is clearly a risky one, considering that the film
products are not everlasting and occur only as long as the production is on location.
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Regardless, film commissioners eager to settle and get a film going easily persuade
policy makers to become part of the prisoner’s dilemma. It seems as if the cycle is ongoing, and with the increase of low-production indie films and television series as a main
component of major film studio audience attractions, it is no wonder the competition is
sky-rocketing.
According to Litvak, “The average major Hollywood feature picture has a
production budget of approximately $60 million, and about 33% of the budget is
generally spent on location. Between 1994-2004, the average cost of production by
Hollywood majors increased from $34.3 million to $63.6 million” (Litvak, 282). Thus,
film commissions are getting more and more eager to attract investors and policy makers
are becoming more easily persuaded to enact tax incentive packages in order to do so.
Given this, states are now using new media as a way to persuade film production
companies to come their way. For example, Georgia’s film commission presents overtly
on their website, “On May 12, 2008 Governor Sonny Perdue signed into law the Georgia
Entertainment Industry Investment Act, boosting the state tax credit for qualified
production and post-production expenditures by as much as 30%” (Georgia Film
Commission Website). As well, Georgia’s film commission places the application for
production openly on their website, encouraging new and innovative industries, such as
gaming and animation.
Texas’ Film Commission and Office of the Governor website promotes its
production incentives of “a payment equal to 5% of eligible in-state spending, including
wages paid to Texas residents, upon completion of an audit of Texas expenditures”
(Texas Film Commission Website). Texas also places their rules and regulations on their
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website a minimum of a million dollars in in-state spending, having eighty percent of the
production completed in Texas, seventy percent of paid crew be Texas residents as well
as the cast and extras. The Texas Commission also provides further in-state spending
incentives, if film productions use unused areas, such as areas around Austin and Dallas
City Hall. Further, Texas keeps certain productions from gaining any production support.
These projects are defined clearly as reality television shows, pornography, and pieces as
odd as casino-type video games.
According to Utah’s Film Commission website, the governor provides “a postperformance rebate of production dollars spent in the state of Utah. An approved
production will be rebated 15% on every dollar spent in the State of Utah. A production
must spend a minimum of $1,000,000 in the state to qualify” (Utah Film Commission
Website). As well, Utah’s Film Commission offers the resources of federal, state, and
city and county agencies, in order to help production companies with their location
shootings. Such agencies include Governor’s Office of Economic Development, Utah
Office of Tourism, National Parks Services, and the Department of Defense.
Going local, as California is trying to keep films from leaving its indebted
economy, Oregon, is boasting greener pastures to the North: “Our incentive programs
rebate 20% of your Oregon-based goods and services, and an additional cash payment of
up to 16.2% of wages paid to production personnel” (Oregon Film Commission Website).
The Oregon’s Film Commission claims that unlike most other states, film producers will
get cash rebates instead of credits for their business. Also, Oregon uses it’s no sales tax
policy as a further incentive and will even do a comparative budget analysis against other
states. As well as no sales tax, Oregon provides further savings of fee-free state parks,
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counties, and cities, hotel discounts, waived lodging taxes, and dual marketing for casting
(Oregon Website).
Whether considered a Film Office, Commission, or Bureau, all states have them.
As shown above, tax incentive competition has become a marketing ploy used in order to
hook investors with each film trying to “out-state” the other. States are in fact attracting
different blockbuster films such as Tyler Perry Studios’ Madea Goes to Jail (Tyler Perry,
2008) in Georgia, Crystal Lake Entertainments’ Friday the 13th (Marcus Nispel, 2009) in
Texas, Disney’s High school Musical 3: Senior Year (Kenny Ortega, 2008) in Utah, and
Laika Entertainment’s Coraline (Henry Selick, 2009) in Oregon. So clearly, the incentive
packages are working to relocate films from Hollywood to the rest of the country.
However, Hollywood is still the general foundation from which most dreams come true.
But the general question to be pursued is “now what?” As mentioned before, scholars
argue that tax competition between states is not only detrimental to the national economy,
but is unconstitutional. The projects are short term and the location-shoots are only
temporary. The industry is footloose and more companies, independent and local, are
contributing to propel growth in the industry. Regardless of locally based productions, the
big budget films are still in Hollywood. With this in mind, we look to Peter Enrich, who
argues, “business tax policy will be driven by tax competition, which will become more
aggressive as business mobility, national and international, increases” (Enrich, 105).
As films are still strongly seen as Hollywood-oriented, it’s important to look at
the source of the interstate competition: Hollywood itself. States depend on the artistic
qualities and quantities of technological and human capitol in California. This is why it’s
unnerving to find that Hollywood, in this time of severe recession, is being cut from
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national stimulus package. According to The New York Times, “Senator John McCain
joined Senator Tom Coburn in opposing a provision that would give the film industry
additional help. Senator Max Baucus contended the item would benefit independent,
small filmmakers. The Senate voted 52-45 to strip the provision out of the package”
(Phillips). Even though Hollywood is being said to be “doing okay,” the question of how
this is going to hit state film commissions and local film markets couldn’t be far from
negative. The trickle-down effect should only get worse, before it gets better. It appears
that federal senators have their eyes strictly on Hollywood and aren’t looking at the
interstate commerce competition that has developed around it.
It’s clear that film genres, such as musicals and comedies, have propelled not only
the human psyche through difficult times in our economy. Despite the fact that scholars
denounce interstate tax competition, it’s still present and it doesn’t appear to be slowing
down. States are using the film industry to propel economic growth in their economies.
Locals aren’t paying higher taxes and many are getting production jobs on set. Film
Commissioners are promoting their states as advertisements on the silver screen across
the nation when audiences watch films with their state landscapes in the background.
However, even if the success is short-term, at least it’s providing some strategy for
governors and law makers. Some of these short-term productions are creating interest in
the local sectors to create their own studios to further long term growth in their cities and
counties. Escapist films during economic hardships provide audiences with the emotional
basis to propel their economies out of recessions. Nonetheless, with a reduced subsidy
package for Hollywood, the future remains ambiguous.
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